Anti-Enforcement Injunctions after Google v Tsargrad and UniCredit v RusChemAlliance

A Russian-Law Perspective on English Anti-Suit and Anti-Enforcement Relief in Sanctions-Related Cross-Border Disputes.
Article as at 11 August 2026

1. Two stages of the same jurisdictional conflict

UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2024] UKSC 30 and Google LLC and Google Ireland Ltd v NAO Tsargrad Media and others [2025] EWHC 94 (Comm) concern the same basic problem at different procedural stages.

In UniCredit, the English courts intervened while Russian proceedings were pending. The principal remedy was an anti-suit injunction requiring RusChemAlliance to discontinue proceedings brought in Russia in alleged breach of a Paris-seated arbitration agreement.

In Google, the Russian proceedings had already produced judgments. Google therefore obtained anti-enforcement injunctions restraining the defendants from seeking recognition or enforcement of those judgments outside Russia, together with ancillary anti-anti-suit relief.

Both remedies operate in personam. An English court does not order a Russian court to stop proceedings or annul a Russian judgment. It orders a defendant subject to English jurisdiction not to pursue specified conduct. In Google, the injunction did not prevent enforcement inside Russia; it restrained the defendants from exporting the judgments to other jurisdictions.

From a Russian-law perspective, the dispute is therefore not formally about one national court overruling another. It is a conflict between personal orders based on different legal premises: contractual party autonomy in England and sanctions-related access-to-justice law in Russia.

2. The Russian framework: Articles 248.1 and 248.2

Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Arbitrazh Procedure Code were introduced by Federal Law No. 171-FZ of 8 June 2020. A Russian arbitrazh court is a state commercial court, not an arbitral tribunal. Article 248.1 gives Russian arbitrazh courts special jurisdiction over sanctions-related disputes. Where the parties have selected a foreign court or foreign-seated arbitration, the agreement may be displaced if restrictive measures create obstacles to access to justice and make the agreed forum arrangement incapable of performance.

Article 248.2 allows a person facing, or credibly expecting, foreign litigation or foreign-seated arbitration to seek a Russian order prohibiting the initiation or continuation of that proceeding. The Russian court may attach a monetary sanction for non-compliance, capped by reference to the foreign claim and related costs.

In Uraltransmash v PESA, No. 309-ЭС21-6955 (1–3), the Russian Supreme Court held that the imposition of restrictive measures may itself be sufficient to presume impairment of access to justice. The Court nevertheless refused the requested injunction because the Stockholm arbitration had already ended and a final award had been issued. It characterised Article 248.2 relief as preventive: once the relevant foreign proceeding has been completed, a prohibition on continuing it may serve no purpose. The Supreme Court’s Thematic Review No. 8/2026 confirms that an arbitration clause does not prevent a Russian court from hearing a special Article 248.2 application. The review also treats practical problems such as travel restrictions and other sanctions-related barriers as potentially relevant to access to justice. The Code does not, however, expressly establish a general post-judgment anti-enforcement remedy equivalent to the worldwide order made in Google. Article 248.2 is principally framed as a mechanism for stopping foreign proceedings before they are completed. Russian courts have sometimes made broader counter-injunctions, including orders directed at foreign enforcement or foreign anti-suit relief, but the statutory basis for such post-award or post-judgment measures is less explicit.

3. UniCredit: enforcing a Paris arbitration agreement

UniCredit issued seven on-demand bonds in favour of RusChemAlliance. The bonds were governed by English law and required ICC arbitration seated in Paris. RusChemAlliance later claimed approximately €448 million under the bonds and commenced proceedings in the Arbitrazh Court of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. UniCredit responded by seeking an English anti-suit injunction. The UK Supreme Court held that the English court had jurisdiction over UniCredit’s claim. Applying the law then in force, it concluded that the general English governing-law clause extended to the arbitration agreements. The claim therefore concerned English-law contractual obligations.

The Court also held that the selection of Paris as the arbitral seat did not make France the only proper forum for the injunction claim. An anti-suit injunction was not being granted as part of the French courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over an arbitration. It was being granted to enforce the contractual promise not to litigate disputes covered by the arbitration agreement.

The relevant power arose under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, not section 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996. It could be exercised even though no arbitration had been commenced or proposed. French courts would not have granted equivalent anti-suit relief, while an order from an arbitral tribunal would not have provided comparable coercive protection.

The Supreme Court’s decision was narrower than it is sometimes presented. Permission to appeal concerned the English court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court did not reconsider the Court of Appeal’s full discretionary decision to grant final relief.

From the English perspective, Article 248.1 could not alter the meaning or effect of an English-law arbitration agreement. From the Russian perspective, the arbitration agreement did not exclude jurisdiction conferred by Russian procedural law. Each system therefore addressed the party before it while reaching incompatible conclusions about where the dispute should be heard.

The later discharge of the injunction

The practical result changed in February 2025.

On 28 December 2024, the St Petersburg court prohibited UniCredit from pursuing non-Russian proceedings connected with the bonds, required it to take measures to cancel the English order and threatened a €250 million penalty for non-compliance. RusChemAlliance had no assets outside Russia and its officers did not travel outside Russia, whereas UniCredit had assets and business exposure within Russia.

UniCredit itself applied to vary the English order. In UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 99, the Court of Appeal discharged the injunctive parts while preserving the declarations concerning English jurisdiction. It did not decide that the earlier injunction had been wrongly granted. It concluded that UniCredit, as a commercial party, could ask to be released from continuing relief that exposed it to potentially massive Russian penalties. The legal precedent in UniCredit therefore remains, but its operative injunction does not. The case demonstrates the difference between jurisdiction to grant relief and practical ability to make that relief effective.

4. Google: relief after Russian judgments

In Google, three Russian media organisations had obtained Russian judgments arising from Google’s restriction or termination of online services. Google argued that the proceedings had been brought in breach of London arbitration clauses or exclusive English jurisdiction clauses.

The judgments had already led to the seizure in Russia of more than £50 million of assets belonging to Google’s Russian subsidiary. The defendants had also begun recognition or enforcement proceedings in several other jurisdictions. Google therefore sought injunctions restraining use of the Russian judgments outside Russia.

Henshaw J granted final anti-enforcement relief. The court held that:
  • the relevant YouTube jurisdiction wording was exclusive in the contractual context;
  • Google had not submitted to Russian jurisdiction merely by addressing the merits while maintaining its jurisdictional objections; and
  • delay and international comity did not require refusal of relief in the circumstances.

Google’s participation in the Russian proceedings was treated as defensive. Russian procedure had required jurisdictional and substantive arguments to be advanced together, and Google had continued to contest jurisdiction.
The injunction did not invalidate the Russian judgments. It did not prevent their operation in Russia or reverse enforcement already completed there. It restrained the defendants from seeking recognition, enforcement or reliance upon them elsewhere.

That distinction explains the contractual basis of the decision. The English court was not acting as an appellate court over the Russian courts. It was enforcing the defendants’ negative contractual promise not to pursue disputes outside the agreed forum.

The decision should not be understood as creating an automatic entitlement to an anti-enforcement injunction whenever a foreign judgment follows proceedings brought in breach of a forum clause. Such relief remains discretionary. The applicant must establish a clear contractual breach, explain why earlier anti-suit relief was not obtained and overcome the stronger comity concerns that arise after a foreign court has entered judgment.

In Google, the continuing international enforcement campaign was decisive. Although the original Russian proceedings had ended, the alleged breach remained active because the defendants were attempting to use the resulting judgments in third countries.

5. Legal entitlement versus coercive reach

The two cases expose separate questions.

The first is whether the applicant has a legal right to relief. That depends on the scope and governing law of the arbitration or jurisdiction agreement, the English court’s personal jurisdiction and the usual equitable principles.
The second is whether the order can work in practice. That depends on the location of assets, officers, subsidiaries, banking relationships and commercial operations.

UniCredit was strong as a matter of contractual entitlement but weak as a matter of enforcement. RusChemAlliance had little exposure to English contempt jurisdiction, while UniCredit had substantial exposure to Russian coercive measures.

Google involved a different structure. The English court could not reverse Russian enforcement, but the defendants’ attempt to enforce in third countries created additional legal points of contact. The English judgment and injunction could be presented to those courts as evidence of the forum agreement, its breach and the defendants’ conduct.

An anti-enforcement injunction nevertheless does not bind the courts of third states. Each recognition court must apply its own rules on international jurisdiction, public policy and the recognition of foreign judgments. The English order strengthens the judgment debtor’s position but does not determine the foreign recognition application.

6. The Arbitration Act 2025 limits the future reach of UniCredit

The governing-law analysis used in UniCredit has since been changed by section 6A of the Arbitration Act 1996, inserted by the Arbitration Act 2025 and in force from 1 August 2025.

Under section 6A, an arbitration agreement is governed by:
  1. the law expressly selected for the arbitration agreement itself; or
  2. in the absence of such an express choice, the law of the arbitral seat.

A general choice of law for the main contract does not, by itself, amount to an express choice for the arbitration agreement.

Accordingly, in a new case involving an English-law contract and Paris-seated arbitration, the arbitration agreement will ordinarily be governed by French law unless the parties expressly choose another law for the arbitration clause. The particular contractual gateway relied upon in UniCredit may therefore be unavailable, although other grounds of English jurisdiction may still exist.

The change does not remove the English court’s section 37 power. It changes the governing-law and jurisdictional analysis that must precede its exercise.

7. Practical consequences

Parties should now state expressly which law governs the arbitration agreement. An English governing-law clause for the main contract is no longer enough where the arbitration is seated abroad.

Dispute-resolution provisions should also be coordinated across guarantees, bonds, facility agreements and security documents. Different clauses may authorise different proceedings, and an English court will not restrain foreign litigation unless the contractual breach is clear.

Where Russian proceedings are commenced, an application for anti-suit relief should normally be considered before judgment. At the same time, a defendant may need to participate in Russia to avoid default. Any jurisdictional objection should therefore be stated expressly, maintained throughout the proceedings and separated from any conditional defence on the merits.

Finally, the parties should analyse coercive exposure before starting an injunction battle. The decisive factors may be not only the wording of the arbitration clause but also where each side has assets, personnel and continuing business. UniCredit shows that a legally justified injunction may become commercially unsustainable. Google shows that post-judgment relief may still be valuable where the judgment creditor is pursuing an international enforcement strategy.

Conclusion

UniCredit confirms that an English court may restrain Russian proceedings in order to enforce an arbitration agreement connected with English law, even where the arbitration is seated elsewhere. Its later history shows, however, that an injunction may fail as a practical instrument when the defendant is outside English coercive reach and the claimant remains exposed in Russia.

Google extends the analysis to the post-judgment stage. The English court may restrain a party from enforcing outside Russia judgments obtained through proceedings brought in breach of English jurisdiction or arbitration agreements. It does not annul the Russian judgments; it restricts their international use.

The central issue after these cases is therefore not simply which court has jurisdiction. It is whether a contractual forum right can still be protected after a competing court has acted — and which jurisdiction has the practical power to compel obedience.

How I Can Help

As a Russian-qualified advocate with more than 20 years of legal experience and a licensed legal "advocate" I advise foreign companies, financial institutions and private clients on complex disputes involving Russian courts, international arbitration, sanctions-related jurisdiction, Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Arbitrazh Procedure Code, anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. I can assist with assessing jurisdictional and enforcement risks, developing a coordinated strategy across Russian and foreign proceedings, preparing expert opinions on Russian law, and working alongside international counsel in cross-border litigation and arbitration. Readers requiring advice on any of the issues discussed in this article are welcome to contact me for a confidential consultation.
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